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Local food supply chain resilience to 
constitutional change: The Brexit effect 
 
Abstract  
Purpose: To investigate how local supply chains prepare for and respond to the threats 
and opportunities presented by constitutional change, thereby building resilience.  
Design/methodology/approach: Multiple case study analysis of 14 firms in the food 
sector is presented LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶V impending exit from the 
European Union (Brexit). Organisations studied include farmers, processors, retailers and 
non-government organisations (NGOs). Data from interviews and roundtable discussions 
has been interpreted using the dynamic capabilities perspective, covering the sensing, 
seizing and transforming stages. 
Findings: The process of building resilience to constitutional change is argued to contrast 
with building resilience to many other threats. In particular, there is a long time horizon 
during the build-up; there is a high certainty of disruption; the event is known and 
deliberate, although not purposefully intended to cause disruption; and all firms in the 
broad environment will be affected. The findings suggest that dynamic capabilities are 
important as organisations seek to collaborate to lobby government, identify new business 
opportunities and reconfigure their supply chains to reduce vulnerability. Extant supply 
chain resilience is also argued to be a source of protection during this volatile period.  
Research limitations/implications: The study could be extended to include post-Brexit 
interviews to further understand the seizing and transforming stages whilst the impact of 
Brexit on actors that remain within the EU could also be considered. 
Practical implications: Practitioners need to work together to influence the future shape 
of the constitution; and they need to reconfigure their operations and supply chains where 
necessary to become more resilient to the threat posed by Brexit, such as by reducing their 
reliance on EU funding streams and trade. The study also has policy implications. 
Originality/value: The first study of supply chain resilience to constitutional change and 
a rare empirical study of resilience across multiple supply chain tiers.  
 




Supply Chain Resilience (SCRes) broadly refers to the ability of supply chains to prepare 
for and/or respond effectively to disruptions, ideally emerging as stronger entities 
(Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Ponis & Koronis, 2012). Several studies have recently 
appeared on this topic, as reviewed by authors such as Bhamra et al. (2011), Hohenstein 
et al. (2015), and Tukamuhabwa et al. (2015). For example, Tukamuhabwa et al. (2015) 
found that the SCRes field remains in its infancy with limited empirical research, 
including a lack of work that examines multiple tiers of a supply chain or network. 
Meanwhile, although there has been an emphasis on the disruptions to supply chains 
caused by high-profile catastrophic events such as earthquakes, tsunamis and terrorism, 
there is a lack of research that considers resilience to constitutional change. This includes 
resilience to the changes currently being experienced in the United Kingdom (UK) as a 
result of Brexit, LHWKH8.¶V planned exit from the European Union (EU). Brexit has the 
potential to have huge consequences for firms in the UK, impacting the cost and 
availability of both supply and demand from Europe and the availability of capacity 
resources, including migrant workers; and the characteristics of the threat in terms of its 
probability of impact, the time available to prepare, and the uncertainty of its 
consequences make it quite different to other events studied in the SCRes literature. This 
paper uses empirical evidence gathered from interviews across multiple tiers of food 
supply chains, including with farmers, processors, retailers and non-government 
organisations (NGOs), to uncover how actors are preparing for and responding to the 
threats (and opportunities) presented by Brexit; and the resulting data has been interpreted 
from a dynamic capabilities perspective (Teece et al., 1997).  
Local food supply chains, including in the UK, have become increasingly important in 
the light of global food security concerns, calls for enhanced traceability, increases in 
food poverty, and political and environmental disruptions to global supply chains. Indeed, 
the local food concept can be argued to have many competitive advantages, both in terms 
of business performance and sustainability that suggest it should be encouraged. For 
example, it addresses environmental sustainability through potential supply network 
changes that reduce food miles and social sustainability through employment of the local 
community (Oglethorpe & Heron, 2013, Czinkota et al., 2014). Yet ongoing, increasing 
competitive pressures on small local farmers and uncertainty caused by Brexit mean the 
survival of local food supply chains in the UK may be under threat. Hence, building 
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SCRes for local food systems in particular is increasingly both a key challenge and 
opportunity. Thus, there is a timely motivation to research the measures needed to sustain 
and strengthen local food supply chains, thereby building SCRes in this context. The 
resilience of local and global food systems has received much attention in other fields 
(e.g. Rockström et al. 2009; Allouche, 2011; Barthel et al., 2015; Walsh-Dilley et al., 
2016) but only limited attention from an operations and supply chain management 
perspective (e.g. Leat & Reveredo-Giha, 2013). 
This paper therefore addresses both the timely need to investigate SCRes in the local 
food context and the gaps identified in the SCRes literature, i.e. to consider resilience in 
the light of constitutional change in multi-tier supply chains. It examines the impact of 
Brexit on local food supply chains in the UK with a particular focus on how supply chain 
DFWRUVDUHSUHSDULQJIRU WKH8.¶VSODQQHGH[LWIURm the EU. The dynamic capabilities 
theoretical lens that is adopted helps to establish how the actors DUHµsensing¶WKHFXUUHQW
supply chain context, including developing an understanding of the disruption caused by 
constitutional change KRZ WKH\ DUH µseizing¶ DQ\ DVVRFLDWHG RSSRrtunities; and 
subsequently how WKH\DUHµreconfiguring¶WKHLUEXVLQHVVHVtowards being more resilient. 
The study therefore asks the following research question:  
How can SCRes be built in local food supply chains during periods of constitutional 
change? In particular, how can dynamic capabilities aid in understanding SCRes in 
this context? 
The paper contributes to the extant literature on SCRes by providing the first empirical 
study of how firms are building resilience to constitutional change; by providing a rare 
study of resilience across multiple supply chain tiers; and by outlining how the 
characteristics of the threat posed by constitutional change differ from the characteristics 
of other threats more typically studied in the literature. Moreover, the paper contributes 
to the literature on dynamic capabilities by highlighting the role of horizontal (and 
vertical) collaboration between supply chain actors in the sensing, seizing, and 
transforming process. 
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
background to the study, including a brief review of relevant literature on SCRes and 
dynamic capabilities. Section 3 outlines the research method adopted before the findings 
are presented in Section 4. A discussion follows in Section 5 before the paper concludes 




2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
Section 2.1 below reviews the literature on SCRes and identifies the research gaps to be 
addressed in this study. The theoretical lens adopted is then described in Section 2.2 
enabling a detailed justification of the choice of dynamic capabilities as a theoretical lens 
to aid in understanding the data from this study. 
 
2.1. Supply Chain Resilience (SCRes) 
The concept of SCRes is based on the notion that not all risks can be avoided, but by 
building resilience firms can manage the threat of disruption so goods and services can 
continue to be delivered to customers (Ambulkar et al., 2015; Scholten & Schilder, 2015). 
6&5HVLVEURDGO\FRQFHUQHGZLWKDVXSSO\FKDLQ¶VUHDGLQHVVHIIHFWLYHUHVSRQVHWRDQG
recovery from a disruption ± returning to the previous level or an even better level of 
performance (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Ponis & Koronis, 2012; Hohenstein et al., 
2015; Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). While some of the disruptions faced by organisations 
and supply chains are external, others originate from within the boundaries of the supply 
chain. The focus of much prior work has been on high-profile external catastrophic 
events, including devastating earthquakes, fuel crises, political turmoil, diseases, 
terrorism, and hurricanes (Singhal et al. 2011; Mandal, 2012; Sodhi et al. 2012; Chen et 
al. 2013; Sawik, 2013; Scholten et al., 2014). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, the 
literature has not considered resilience to external constitutional change, such as that 
currently being experienced in the UK as a result of Brexit. 
The focus of prior SCRes work has also been on proposing strategies that can be 
employed to build resilience (Ali et al., 2017). Many of these strategies are interrelated 
while they can be employed proactively in anticipation of a disruption and/or reactively 
in response to a disruption (e.g. Hollnagel, 2011; Dabhilkar et al., 2016; Ali et al., 2017). 
The list includes broad approaches such as improving flexibility, creating redundancy, 
improving supply chain agility, and enhancing visibility (e.g. Hohenstein et al., 2015). 
Other, more specific practices include information sharing (Brandon-Jones et al., 2014) 
and reconfiguring resources (Ambulkar et al., 2015). Meanwhile, this literature also 
highlights the role of supply chain collaboration, appropriate supplier selection, and 
supply chain network design in developing resilience (e.g. Scholten et al., 2014) ± all of 
which are arguably linked to the motivations behind local sourcing. 
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The extant literature is currently dominated by modelling and conceptual work, e.g. 
with several authors calling for more empirical studies on SCRes (e.g. Ambulkar et al., 
2015; Hohenstein et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2015). Meanwhile, Kim et al. (2015) argued 
that resilience should be analysed from a network perspective, with most studies on 
SCRes being conducted at the firm level. A rare study to examine resilience across a 
network of interrelated firms was conducted by Tukamuhabwa et al. (2017). This proved 
important in highlighting the inter-relatedness of threats, strategies and their outcomes; 
and how threats can migrate from one actor to another across the network. Therefore, not 
only is more empirical work required but it is argued to be important to look further at 
resilience across multiple levels of the supply chain.  
Some of the few prior case study contributions have focused on specific industries, for 
example: Borekci et al. (2015) looked at SCRes in buyer-supplier triads with a focus on 
the textile industry; Johnson et al. (2013) investigated social capital and SCRes in the 
context of a UK rail crash; and Urciuoli et al. (2014) examined strategies for building the 
resilience of energy supply chains. There is a need to conduct further in-depth research in 
particular industries, including the food industry, which has faced a number of disruptions 
in recent years (e.g. Marucheck et al., 2011). To the best of our knowledge, the only 
SCRes study that has focused specifically on issues in the food industry is that by Leat & 
Revoredo-Giha (2013). The authors presented a case study of a pork supply chain in 
Scotland with a particular emphasis on the role of collaboration in developing a more 
resilient agri-food supply system. For example, the authors highlighted the importance of 
horizontal collaboration between meat processors and vertical collaboration between 
processors and retailers for reducing the vulnerability of the supply chain to disruption. 
Leat & Revoredo-Giha (2013) noted that there is governmental interest in the concept of 
resilience in terms of how it relates to sustainable food supply chains and policies (e.g. 
Scottish Government, 2009, cited in Leat & Revoredo-Giha, 2013), but governmental 
policies and regulations on food are quite different to the consequences of specific, one-
off shifts such as Brexit. 
Beyond the research specifically on SCRes, there is a broad literature related to the 
topic of food and disruption. For example, in the context of supply chain uncertainty, 
Simangunsong et al. (2016) studied a network of firms in the food industry and 
highlighted the influence of unethical practices on uncertainty, including collusion and 
parallel interaction between firms at the same tier of the supply chain. This built on a 
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large body of literature on supply chain uncertainty, as reviewed by Simangunsong et al. 
(2012), including the work of van der Vorst et al. (1998) who focused on managing 
sources of supply chain uncertainty to improve performance in food supply chains, 
outlining improvement principles to increase service levels. Meanwhile, Vlajic et al. 
(2012) focused on the concept of robustness, proposing an integrated framework for the 
design of robust food supply chains, which the authors applied to a meat supply chain.  
There is also much literature around food security that is broadly relevant. For 
example, Roth et al. (2008) highlighted the complexities and risks associated with global 
food supply chains and examined disruption to the pet food supply chain caused by 
product contamination and recalls. Kelepouris et al. (2007) highlighted the value of RFID 
technology for improving traceability in the food industry while Pullman et al. (2009) 
examined sustainability practices in the food and beverage industry highlighting a focus 
on environmentally sustainable practices. Further, Whipple et al. (2009) investigated 
supply chain security in the food industry and compared local and global supply chains. 
The authors found that global supply chains place greater emphasis on security than 
domestic supply chains and that they are more likely to assess the security procedures of 
supply chain partners. Security was perceived as being more of a concern in global supply 
chains but firms with global supply chains were also perceived to have a greater ability 
to detect and recover from security incidents. Finally, Marucheck et al. (2011) highlighted 
the product safety and security risks in five industries, including food, and pointed to the 
global nature of supply chains as contributing to risk and vulnerability. The authors 
examined a number of historical events affecting the food industry, including E. coli 
contamination and salmonella outbreaks.  
From the above it follows that the SCRes literature remains in its infancy. There is 
thus far only limited empirical research, with few studies looking at specific industries or 
multiple tiers of the supply chain. Moreover, much of the focus has been on the effects of 
large-scale catastrophic events such as earthquakes and terrorist attacks, with a need for 
further research that considers resilience to constitutional change. In addition to these 
gaps in the literature, there have also been calls for greater use of theory to improve our 
understanding of SCRes (Tukamuhabwa et al., 2015). The most notable theory frames 
used to date are the resource based view (e.g. Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009), systems 
theory (e.g. Blackhurst et al., 2011), contingency theory (e.g. Brandon-Jones et al., 2014), 
and complex adaptive systems theory (e.g. Day, 2014). The wider literature, including 
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the examples above, adds to our understanding of the challenges and disruptions faced by 
food supply chains and points to the potential of domestic supply chains for avoiding 
disruption and vulnerability. But even the wider operations and supply chain management 
literature on food beyond SCRes does not generally consider the impact of constitutional 
change. Thus this paper addresses these research gaps by undertaking explorative case 
study research and adopts a dynamic capabilities theoretical framework, as further 
discussed below. 
 
2.2. Dynamic Capabilities 
Teece et al. (1997) introduced the concept of dynamic capabilities, advocating that it is 
the ability of the firm to sense and adapt to changes in the external environment that will 
be key to sustainability and competitiveness. Thus dynamic capabilities support the 
renewal of competitive resources on a continuous basis, encouraging firms to µintegrate, 
build and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing 
HQYLURQPHQWV¶ (Teece et al., 1997, p516). Firms are thereby expected both to exploit 
existing resources and develop new capabilities, in an attempt to increase adaptability, 
longevity and competitiveness (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  
Dynamic capabilities have been presented as competitive necessities in modern 
business (2018 Gebauer, 2011; Rojo et al., 2018), including during times of economic 
downturn (Ahn et al., 2018). The concept of dynamic capabilities is not however without 
criticism. Indeed, the dynamic capabilities literature has been described as tautological 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) and obscure (Gebauer, 2011). Teece et al. (1997) even 
argued that dynamic capabilities cannot be defined or generalised as that would conflict 
with the competitive values of scarcity and inimitability upon which resource-based 
theories are reliant. The authors argued that dynamic capabilities are unique to every firm 
and may be built upon organisational culture or history (Teece et al., 1997). In an attempt 
to offer some clarity, Teece (2007) later produced three categories of dynamic capabilities 
± sensing, seizing and transforming ± where:  
x Sensing is described by 7HHFHSDVD³scanning, creation, learning and 
LQWHUSUHWLYH DFWLYLW\´ in which firms recognise opportunities and threats. Gebauer 
(2011) suggested such activities are undertaken frequently and encouraged market-





threats. Barreto (2010) stressed the need to make sure that such decisions are both 
timely and market focused.  
x Transforming involves the reconfiguration of intangible and tangible assets, often to 
enhance, combine, or protect firm capabilities (Teece, 2007). It is here where 
operational efficiency is realised via routines that can adapt to changing environments 
on a continuous basis (Gebauer, 2011).  
 
Thus dynamic capabilities enhance evolutionary fitness by enabling the creation, 
extension, and modification of the resource base and in turn generating long-run 
competitive success (Teece, 2007). Given that we are interested in ³HYROXWLRQDU\ ILWQHVV´ 
during a period of constitutional change, it is argued that the dynamic capabilities 
perspective represents an appropriate theoretical lens. Further, there are similarities here 
with the notion of resilience being concerned with preparation for, response to, and 
recovery from a disruption (Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Ponis & Koronis, 2012). 
Sensing would ideally take place in the preparation phase before a supply chain is 
disrupted; seizing may take place before or in response to a threat; and transforming may 
take place before, during or after a threat has affected a supply chain, or a transformation 
may mean a threat is avoided altogether. The features of the dynamic capabilities 
perspective and of SCRes are thus depicted in Figure 1. Further, a key feature that runs 
throughout the three phases of the dynamic capabilities approach is an emphasis not only 
on threats but also on opportunities, and this supports the notion of supply chains 
potentially emerging as stronger entities. This is also suitable in the context of Brexit and 
constitutional change in general where there is uncertainty in how the competitive 
landscape will be altered. Brexit presents challenges to supply chains but it may also 
present new opportunities, providing a stimulus for innovation. Thus we adopt this 
perspective, with the constructs of sensing, seizing and transforming being used to aid in 
the development of the interview protocol and in the subsequent analysis on the resilience 
of local food supply chains to constitutional change.  
 






3. Research Method 
3.1 Research Design and Case Selection 
Given the explorative nature of the research, a multi-case study approach was adopted to 
enable in-depth investigation of the phenomenon of interest (Voss et al., 2016). In total, 
14 case studies have been included: 3 NGOs (Non-Government Organisations); 3 farms; 
4 processors; and 4 retailers. Hence, multiple tiers of food supply chains have been 
incorporated. Table 1 provides a list of these organisations and indicates the mnemonics 
used hereafter to refer to the data for the 18 individual interviewees. The cases were 
selected using theoretical replication sampling logic (Voss et al., 2016) to allow 
contrasting results to be identified but for predictable reasons (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2009; Voss et al., 2016). Thus, different tiers of the supply chain are included to provide 
both buyer and supplier perspectives; different product groups are included to allow for 
differences according to product type; and the variety of organisational sizes ranges from 
the family farm/farm shop through to a national supermarket chain. In addition, the three 
NGOs were selected to ensure a breadth of coverage of consumer issues as well as all 
farming types from horticulture/other crops through to dairy/eggs and livestock. Thus the 
research sought to ensure a breadth of understanding of the effect of Brexit on the local 
UK food industry. Finally, all of the organisations studied were known to have an interest 
in local food, albeit to varying degrees. For example, Retailers 1 and 2 both focus on 
primarily selling food produced in their local regions; whilst Retailer 3 has a reputation 
for stocking an above average percentage of local, artisan produce for the supermarket 
sector; and Retailer 4 stocks a wide portfolio of produce, but this includes the strategic 
purchase and promotion of eggs from Local Farm 3 and sausages/ burgers from Local 
Processor 2. Thus there is an array of methods of operationalising WKHWHUPµORFDO¶FRYHUHG
in the cases studied ± including all produced and sold in the local region through to all 
produced and sold within the UK.  
[Take in Table 1] 
 
3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
Data collection began after the Brexit vote in June 2016, taking place between November 
2016 and September 2017. There were two stages of data collection. First, interviews 
with the 18 representatives from the 14 cases listed in Table 1 were carried out. Second, 
to validate and broaden the findings, all interviewees (and other non-interviewees) were 
invited to one of two roundtable discussions. Ten participants attended the first of these 
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workshops, 7 of whom were interviewees. At the second workshop, there were nine 
participants, none of whom had taken part in the interviews. The organisational types 
represented at the two roundtable discussions are also given in Table 1. As Chatham 
House rules were agreed, evidence from the workshops is not attributed to individuals but 
is anonymously referred to by the mnemonics W1 and W2 for workshops 1 and 2, 
respectively.  
The initial interviews focused on three main categories of questions ± each of which 
was investigated both for the individual organisation and its wider supply chain. First, the 
nature of the current business model and supply chain relationships was explored. This 
data allowed for the analysis of the extant vulnerabilities and strengths; enabled historical 
analysis of SCRes (as prior system shocks along with system responses were described 
by respondents); and provided an understanding of the contextual advantages and 
disadvantages of EU membership. Second, the processes surrounding the Brexit vote 
were examined to explore what information was available prior to the vote as relevant to 
the organisation/supply chain; and to determine any immediate effects of the vote process 
itself or the outcome of the vote. Third, the potential impact of Brexit, i.e. the future point 
in time when the UK leaves the EU, was discussed with each interviewee.  
A case study protocol was used to ensure consistent coverage of the interview 
questions and to ensure that due attention was given to research ethics procedures. The 
interviews were semi-structured, allowing the interviewee to provide additional 
information as appropriate and to enable freedom of expression. For the majority of the 
cases, data triangulation was provided either through multiple interviewees or through 
additional documentary evidence. To ensure reliability of the data, it was all recorded and 
transcribed. Data analysis was carried out by coding the data, using both open coding and 
constructs from the dynamic capabilities literature. Findings from the case study analysis 
were presented at the two roundtable discussions ± thus a key objective for these events 
was to validate and discuss the results of the study.  In addition, each participant of the 
roundtable discussion was asked to speak for five minutes on the expected impact of 
Brexit on their organisation/ area of expertise, including how they were planning to grasp 
opportunities as well as respond to threats.  Thus the roundtable discussions also enabled 





Our findings suggest that a significant stage in building SCRes during constitutional 
change involves developing a deep understanding of the potential disruption ± the stage 
labelled sensing using the dynamic capabilities theoretical lens adopted in this paper. 
Thus this section commences below with a discussion of how organisations are sensing 
the challenges/threats and opportunities surrounding Brexit in sections 4.1 and 4.2, 
respectively. This is followed by a description of how some of the organisations studied 
DUHµseizing¶RSSRUWXQLWLHVand beginning the process of µtransforming¶ in Section 4.3. All 
three stages together are argued to be important parts of the process of building SCRes.  
Yet some firms have claimed to be reliant on extant SCRes, rather than needing to seize 
opportunities or transform their businesses at this point in time.  Table 2 summarises key 
constructs from the empirical evidence on which the discussion in the three subsections 
below is built. 
[Take in Table 2] 
 
4.1. Sensing Challenges and Threats Surrounding Brexit 
The main challenges/threats identified from the cases can be summarised as follows: 
1. A (worse) replacement of the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) and the 
associated subsidies for farmers; 
2. Uncertainty leading, for example, to a lack of investment confidence; 
3. Poorer international trade agreements; 
4. Labour shortages; 
5. Food price inflation; 
6. Fewer family farms; 
7. A lack of voice for the farming community; 
8. Currency effects. 
 
The evidence for each of these challenges/threats is summarised in part (a) of Table 2. 
As discussed below, these factors all have the potential to have a significant impact on: 
supply chain prices; supply chain social and environmental sustainability; and therefore 
on local food supply and its resilience.  
In terms of the potential impact on supply chain prices, this may be affected by a lower 
level of CAP subsidy given that effectively this subsidy reduces the price of food at the 
point of purchase by the consumer. As stated by interviewee F1-,³you would think 
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generally that they [the subsidies] find their way to the consumer¶VSRFNHW«,WDIIHFWVWKH
price of the food that the processor pays and the retailer pays and ultimately it is knocked 
RIIWKHHQGSULFHRIWKHIRRG«WKHFRQVXPHUSURGXFW ,WKLQNWKDW¶VZKDW the government 
KDVWRWKLQNDERXWUDWKHUWKDQZKHWKHUDVSHFLILFIDUPHU«LVJRQQDJHWWKDW[DPRXQWRI
FDVKLQKLVSRFNHWLW¶VWKHRYHUDOOSULFHRIIRRG´ Thus, if subsidies are lower, it follows 
that the price of food may increase if affected local farms continue to supply that food. 
This effect will vary according to farming sector, as argued by NGO1: "7KHVHFWRUWKDW¶V
PRVWH[SRVHGLV WKHOLYHVWRFNVHFWRU7KDW¶V WKHRQHWKDW¶VDOZD\VUHFHLYHGWKHKLJKHVW
level of subsidy. If you take the subsidy out of those systems, virtually none of them return 
any sort of profit. And the sector that is massively dependant is the upland livestock 
sector. If you look at their figures in terms of income, in some circumstances it may be 
that 50-60% of their income is dHULYHGIURPVXEVLG\SDUWLFXODUO\LI\RX¶YHJRWDELJIHOO
farm with an environmental scheme, and a big basic payment scheme; so, the one sector 
that is probably most at risk in terms of Brexit [«] in terms of change of support is 
probably the upland sheep sector." Opinions varied in terms of the risks of subsidies 
being changed with NGO2 recognising competing demands on government budgets³LW¶V
going to be a big battle, holding onto that budget for agricultural and rural development, 
,¶YHJRWQRGRXEWDERut that. I do think a lot of things that are coming out of the National 
Health Service [NHS] at the moment are preparing the ground, additional money needed 
in the NHS..."; whilst NGO3 stated: "you get a sense there will be some kind of subsidies 
involved in a post-%UH[LW IRRG IDUPLQJVWUDWHJ\«\RXNLQGRIJHWD VHQVH WKDW LWZLOO
probably be close to status quo; so an emphasis on direct subsidies based on land area, 
so the effective under-VXEVLGLVDWLRQRIKRUWLFXOWXUHZKLFKXVHVOHVVODQG«6R\RXJHWD
VHQVHWKDWSUREDEO\LQWHUPVRIVXSSRUWHWFLW¶VSUREDEO\EXVLQHVVDVXVXDO Thus, whilst 
there was not a consensus on the likely levels of future support post Brexit, it is important 
to understand the potential impact of changes on future food prices. In addition, supply 
chain prices have already risen due to currency effects that have made the price of 
imported food more expensive, and there is ongoing uncertainty regarding the future 
effect of the Brexit decision on exchange rates. 
If food price inflation does occur, then the market may respond in a number of ways 
and the interviewees expressed concern about the detrimental effect of some of these 
potential responses on social and/or environmental sustainability in the supply chain. In 
particular, several interviewees stressed that attempts to reduce food prices through 
 13 
 
greater farm efficiency have the potential to reduce the number of smaller family-run 
farms, which are at the heart of many rural communities. For example, F2 stated: ³«
there is the danger around Brexit combined with the financial crisis, with global over 
supply, I think there is a perfect storm right now. There is a global will to keep food prices 
really low « The combined effect of the two things is the reason that many dairy farmers 
are likely to be unable to survive over the next two to three years «3% of the dairy farms 
in the USA produce 50% of the milkDQGWKDWPRGHOLVFRPLQJKHUH« There will be more 
commercially run farms, and less of the family units. This will affect all sectors of 
IDUPLQJ´. The threat was argued to be significant by F1-I1, F2 and NGO3, given a 
perceived lack of voice for the farming community compared with other sectors. 
Alternatively, more food could be imported, which may be cheaper (irrespective of 
fluctuating exchange rates) due to lower standards of environmental and/ or social 
sustainability. As stated by R3-,³the effect of coming out of Europe [could be] opening 
up international trade where certain goods may become cheaper, but a lot of the 
regulations for food safety and quality could be compromised if it means that the UK 
GRHVQ¶WFUHDWHLWVRZQVWDQGDUGVWKDWDUHLQOLQHFXUUHQWO\ZLWK(XURSH´. This could then 
threaten the overall supply of food to the UK if it becomes more dependent on global 
supply chains and their vulnerability to transportation risks/ natural disasters.  
SCRes will also be impacted by the availability of European migrant workers, which 
was argued to be particularly important to: the horticultural sector (NGO3); to the 
processing tier of the supply chain, such as large abattoirs (NGO2); and also to Processor 
3, which is a small artisan baker. Moreover, many of the farming sectors rely on 
international trade agreements both within the EU and further afield for their export 
markets, thereby supplementing the income achievable in the UK. Thus the threat of 
poorer trade agreements is also likely to impact the viability of UK farming. As stated by 
NGO1: ³So, if we did have a situation like the Doomsday scenario, which is no market 
access to Europe plus no support, I think you would see an absolute devastation´. Thus 
many of the interviewees were keen to stress the perceived threats and challenges 
surrounding Brexit. However, there were also a number of opportunities created by Brexit 
that were identified, as discussed below.   
 
4.2. Sensing Opportunities Surrounding Brexit 
The opportunities identified by the interviewees can be categorised as follows: 
1. A new competitive landscape that potentially favours local food; 
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2. Better CAP replacement with more effective subsidies; 
3. More effective supply chain business models; 
4. Increased export opportunities; 
5. Improved international trade agreements. 
 
The evidence for each of these opportunities is presented in part (b) of Table 2. 
Opportunity #2 and #5 are the opposite of two of the perceived threats and challenges 
from part (a) of Table 2 (Challenge #1 and #3), highlighting the sense of uncertainty 
surrounding the current constitutional context, and recognising the opportunity for 
organisations to lobby the government for positive changes. However, there are also 
opportunities that are within the control of the supply chain organisations, as discussed 
below. 
The first such opportunity is to increase sales if the new constitutional context favours 
local food. This could be due to a NLQGRILQVXODUWXUQLQWKHFRXQWU\´ (NGO3), leading 
to greater customer demand for local food, as argued by P2-,³[national supermarket 
chain X] « WKH\¶UHUHDOO\WU\LQJWRSXVKORFDOVRXUFLQJQRZ,GRWKLQNWKDWSUREDEO\ 
will protect us from Brexit turbulence´DQGFRUURERUDWHGE\Dreport recently published 
by Morrison¶s outlining a policy to buy more local produce (see Benton et al., 2017). 
Thus, as further argued by NGO3: "you get the sense that there could be opportunity for 
WKHZKROHDJULFXOWXUDOVHFWRUDQGKRUWLFXOWXUDOVHFWRUIRU«GLVFXVVLRQVDURXQGQDWLRQDO
resilience and national food security and protecting UK industry´. A second reason for 
this potential increase in local food demand is related to the costs of imported goods, as 
argued by R3-I3: ³7KHUH¶VDSRVVLELOLW\WKDWLQFUHDVLQJFRVWVRILPSRUWHGJRRGVZLOOGULYH
sourcing to UK-produced [goods] a bit more´ However, the same interviewee also stated 
that: :H¶UHDOPRVWDWWKHOLPLWVQRZ[on local sourcing] in my personal opinion because 
RXUVRXUFLQJSROLF\ZKHWKHULW¶VEHHQZULWWHQGRZQRUQRWZULWWHQGRZQLVWKDWZH¶OOWU\
our best to source locally; EXWLILW¶VXQFRPSHWLWLYHDQGWKHTXDOLW\LVQ¶WWKHUHRUWKHVDIHW\
LVQ¶W WKHUH ZH¶UH QRW JRLQJ WR VRXUce it." Therefore, whilst this opportunity may be 
available for increasing the production of local food, this may be constrained by the 
capabilities of local producers. Thus this first opportunity is also linked to the opportunity 
to improve business models, as the two aspects may need to go hand in hand if Brexit-
related opportunities are to be realised. 
In terms of opportunities for improved business models, these were primarily targeted 
at the farming sector, with a particular emphasis on the need for better volatility 
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management and to ensure profitable farming that is either less reliant on government 
subsidy or incentivised by a better replacement of the CAP subsidy. As stated by F3-I1: 
"So it might be that a funding scheme going forward is where a farmer has decided to 
ORRNDWKLVFRVWVDQGJRVRPHZKHUHZKHUHKH¶VKHOSLQJKLPVHOIZLWKFRVWHIILFLHQF\WKDW
triggers funding for that farm." Better volatility management is needed given that prices 
can rise and fall on the commodity markets, as argued by NGO1: ³So what you need to 
EHLVDVHIILFLHQWDV\RXSRVVLEO\FDQDQGXQGHUVWDQGWKDWWKHSULFHLVQ¶WRQO\JRLQJWRJR
up. They [prices] are going to come down as well « what you need to do in that sort of 
scenario is get the cost of production down as low as you possibly can. «When the price 
goes up to « GRQ¶WJRDQGEX\WKUHHQHZWUDFWRUV« Use that money to see you through 
the low. So it really depends I would have said on where individual businesses are in 
terms of knowing the cost of production, understanding the market they are in, as to how 
likely they are to survive when CAP changes´. It can therefore be concluded that 
organisations are sensing both opportunities and threats surrounding Brexit. 
 
4.3. Seizing Opportunities and Beginning to Transform 
+DYLQJ µsensed¶ WKH WKUHDWV DQG opportunities surrounding Brexit, the findings also 
suggest that, at the farming tier, organisations are beginning to µseize¶RSSRUWXQLWLHVWR
strengthen their businesses; and are µtransforming¶ accordingly. For example, Farm 1, 
which had previously supplied milk to the local liquid milk market only is currently 
exploring opportunities to sell to the more profitable London coffee milk market, seeking 
several customers so as to spread the risk. Thus their aim to: ³make a new mDUNHW«
where we spread our risk across a number of different people [customers or markets]´ 
(F1-I2). Others have already become more resilient through responding to prior shocks 
felt in the farming sector (e.g. foot and mouth disease, salmonella scandals, etc.), and 
have thus diversified to become less reliant on the CAP subsidy. For example, Farm 3 
changed the breeds of livestock kept to produce more lean cuts and expanded into the egg 
packing business as the demand for free range eggs grew. Thus, they have made previous 
timely and market focused transformations. Nonetheless, this organisation is far from 
complacent and is one of the most proactive in aiming to influence future agricultural 
policy. 7KXV LQ WKLV FDVH WKH\ DUH µseizing¶ WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ WR LQIOXHQFH JRYHUQPHQW
rather than to transform their business, and this may be an equally important dynamic 
capability in the Brexit context. 
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In contrast, at the processor and retailer tiers, the interviewees commonly expressed a 
µZDWFKLQJEULHI¶DWWLWXGHDQGWKXVthese tiers can be described as being in the early stages 
RIµsensing¶UDWKHUWKDQµseizing¶the impact of this constitutional change. For example, 
5VWDWHG³Part of the challenge is these types of conversations are \RX¶UHtalking three 
to five years hence. Retail thinks six months hence tops [at most] 7KHUH¶V D UHDO
disconnect in the timescales. What keeps me in a job is trying to work our way through 
them but it¶VDELW'DUZLQLDQ ,W¶VQRWKLQJ WRGRZLWK VL]HDQG VWUHQJWK, LW¶V MXVW KRZ
quickly we can adapt´. Thus, concern at this tier is lower on the basis of confidence that 
they will be able to continue to source food and can adapt quickly to new suppliers as 
required, even if those suppliers are not local to the UK. Thus these tiers claim to be 
reliant on extant SCRes, as summarised in part (c) of Table 2. 
 
5. Discussion: Building SCRes during a Period of Constitutional Change 
The findings of this study suggest that there are three main ways in which the local food 
sector can respond to the current uncertainty surrounding the impending exit of the UK 
from the EU, thereby building SCRes. First, the sector can collaborate both horizontally 
and vertically to become involved in influencing the future shape of the constitution, 
which includes: the replacement for the CAP subsidy; international trade agreements that 
will impact access to export markets; and regulations to enable migrant workers to 
continue to be employed in key sectors such as horticulture and abattoirs. Second, 
individual organisations can seize opportunities to reconfigure their businesses so that 
they become less reliant on government subsidy, thereby strengthening their position in 
the local food supply chain. Third, supply chains can rethink pricing strategies to ensure 
that all parties are operating in a profitable and sustainable manner; and/or to become less 
reliant on both imports and exports. Thus, dynamic capabilities play an important role in 
terms of building capabilities to influence change in government policy and/or to 
transform businesses within the supply chain along with their supply chain relationships 
in order to build resilience, as depicted in Figure 2. A general contribution is claimed to 
be made here to the dynamic capabilities literature as our data includes an emphasis on 
the importance of organisations working together, such as in the form of horizontal 
collaboration, to build capabilities during periods of constitutional change. 
 




To the best of our knowledge, the dynamic capabilities literature (e.g. Teece et al., 
1997; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007) has not previously emphasised the 
importance of actors at the same tier of the supply chain working together to sense and 
adapt to changes in the external environment. This approach is partly explained by the 
uncertainty surrounding Brexit and has been facilitated by access to networks, NGOs and 
trade unions. By coming together, firms are sharing information and farmers in particular 
can have a louder voice collectively in terms of communicating their concerns to 
government. There is also evidence that capabilities have been built through experience 
gained from previous disruptions and threats to the supply chain. This suggests that 
resilience is something that can be developed or eroded over time, as argued by 
Tukamuhabwa et al. (2015). For example, firms referred to handling previous disruptions 
caused by foot and mouth disease, and learnings from such disruptions and attempts to 
diversify contributed to their increased ability to handle Brexit. 
The resilience of supply chains to constitutional change is studied here for the first 
time, and it has become apparent that there are clear differences in the characteristics of 
constitutional change when compared to other threats and disruptions to supply chains 
including devastating earthquakes, fuel crises, political turmoil, diseases, terrorism, and 
hurricanes (Singhal et al. 2011; Mandal, 2012; Sodhi et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2013; Sawik, 
2013; Scholten et al., 2014). Firms might prepare for a disruption caused by a tsunami or 
terrorist attack by having clear plans and procedures in place to mitigate the 
consequences; but such a disruption is likely to happen at short or no notice, or it might 
not occur at all. Similarly, a firm may plan for a supply disruption caused by a small scale 
supply disruption, as featured in Tukamuhabwa et al. (2017), such as a late or cancelled 
delivery through redundancy and flexibility, including by holding small buffer stocks or 
having multiple or alternative sources of supply. But constitutional change is different in 
that firms (at the farming tier of the food supply chain at least) began planning two years 
ahead of the disruption, which should have given them time to anticipate and change their 
practices. But it is also uncertain how the change will affect the supply chain and whether, 
in fact, it could have positive consequences or create new opportunities. Firms may gain 
market share by handling a supply disruption caused by a factory fire or tsunami better 
than their rivals (e.g. Norrman & Jansson, 2004). Meanwhile, in the case of constitutional 
change, it may be the firms that have the most capability to innovate or reduce their cost 
base that are able to enhance their competitive position.  
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The process of building resilience to constitutional change is therefore somewhat 
different to building resilience to other threats. In particular, there is a long time horizon 
involved in the disruption; there is a high certainty of disruption; the event is known and 
deliberate, although not purposefully intended to cause disruption; and all firms in the 
broad environment are affected by the disruption. Brexit, for example, is not a low 
probability, high impact event that occurs at short notice. There has been a huge build-up 
WRWKH8.¶VH[LWIURPWKH(8ZKLFKSXWVJUHDWHUHPSKDVLVRQWKHUROHRISUHSDULQJIRU
the disruption; and greater efforts can be put into preparing for Brexit because it is now 
known that it will occur. Hence, the role of sensing threats and opportunities is significant. 
On the other hand, the impact of Brexit is uncertain and is still being influenced ± there 
is time lag between the decision to exit the EU and the impact on stakeholders within the 
supply chain. The time available to prepare is prolonged, and this also creates the 
opportunity to innovate and potentially identify new opportunities for firms. Yet even 
though constitutional change is different from many other disruptions or threats to supply 
chains, the strategies being employed are similar to those from the wider SCRes literature. 
This includes information sharing (Brandon-Jones et al., 2014), collaboration, supply 
chain network (re)design (Scholten et al., 2014), and reconfiguring resources (Ambulkar 
et al., 2015). Similarly, both vertical and horizontal collaboration were also important to 
building a more resilient agri-food supply system in the context of the pork supply chain 
in Scotland, as reported by Leat & Revoredo-Giha (2013). Meanwhile there are some 
similarities with findings from Tukamuhabwa et al. (2017) who referred to the migration 
of threats through the network. Brexit may remove the CAP received by farmers but the 
effect may ripple through the supply chain and ultimately increase the price paid by end 
customers for their food.  
Constitutional change is also more widespread than many other threats to supply 
chains. For example, a factory fire could hit the supplier of one firm but not affect its rival 
next door that is supplied by a different manufacturer. In contrast, all firms in the UK 
across all sectors are likely to be affected in some way by Brexit. To reduce or avoid the 
impact, firms could relocate to mainland Europe; but this is not an option being explored 
by any of the firms involved in this study, perhaps because it is grounded in agriculture, 
family firms and knowledge or familiarity with local land resources. Instead, to minimise 
the impact, firms are exploring other sources of demand outside the EU, including local 
markets in the UK that they have previously overlooked. Although all of the firms studied 
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are affected by the constitutional change, it is evident that different tiers are responding 
differently to the threat. Thus, insight into resilience has been enabled by studying the 
phenomenon across multiple tiers, as advocated by Kim et al. (2015) and Tukamuhabwa 
et al. (2017). )DUPHUV¶EXVLQHVVPRGHOVZLOOFKDQJHif they lose income from the CAP 
and a replacement is uncertain. Some are therefore looking to innovate and improve their 
operational efficiency such that they are less reliant on funding. Some farmers have even 
suggested they do not want the funding to be replaced as it will force farms to improve 
and mean only the best farms survive. Thus, they anticipate the potential to improve their 
competitive position by coping better with the disruption caused by Brexit than their 
rivals. Retailers at the other end of the chain are less concerned by Brexit, perhaps due to 
their size but also due to their agility and ability to respond at shorter notice than farmers, 
and because they have a greater influence on government policy, which reduces the 
uncertainty for them around Brexit. 
 
6. Conclusions  
This paper has investigated the resilience of supply chains to constitutional change by 
examining the impact of Brexit on local food supply chains in the UK. Further, the 
dynamic capabilities theoretical lens has been used to understand how resilience can be 
built by sensing and seizing opportunities and threats, and transforming or reconfiguring 
business models, operations, and supply chains. The paper provides a contribution to the 
literature on supply chain resilience by providing the first empirical study of how firms 
are building resilience to constitutional change; by providing a rare study of resilience 
across multiple supply chain tiers; and by outlining how the characteristics of the threat 
posed by constitutional change differ from the characteristics of other threats more 
typically studied in the literature. Clearly the threat to supply chains presented by 
constitutional change such as that brought about by Brexit is different in its characteristics 
to the threat of natural disasters, financial crises, etc. and has thus been worthy of study 
in its own right. Moreover this paper highlights the importance of the Operations/ Supply 
Chain fields engaging with policy/ constitutional change and demonstrates the role these 
fields can play in responding appropriately. Finally, the paper contributes to the literature 
on dynamic capabilities by highlighting the role of horizontal (and vertical) collaboration 
between supply chain actors in the sensing, seizing, and transforming process.  
 
6.1. Managerial and Policy Implications  
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This research has implications for managers who need to develop their dynamic 
capabilities in order to build SCRes, as discussed above. For example, practitioners across 
the supply chain need to work together to influence the future shape of the constitution; 
and they need to take ownership of their own operations and reconfigure them where 
necessary to become more resilient to the threat posed by Brexit, such as by reducing their 
reliance on EU funding streams and trade. The study also has implications for agricultural 
policy. In particular, the findings suggest that there are significant risks associated with 
reducing the CAP subsidy as this is likely to lead to higher prices at the point of food 
consumption for the consumer, thereby extenuating food poverty problems and/or making 
UK food production less competitive, which threatens the economic sustainability of the 
sector as well as food safety standards. Thus there is a need for more research to consider 
the precise form that the replacement for CAP should take, but it is important that it: (i) 
incentivises good practice and operational excellence (e.g. in animal welfare and 
environmental practices); (ii) incentivises effective and sustainable use of resources (e.g. 
the countryside, given links to the tourism industry); (iii) discourages over-supply and 
waste; and (iv) supports rural communities to be business focused (for social 
sustainability). 
 
6.2. Limitations and Future Research 
This study has focused on the build-up to Brexit. It could therefore be interesting to 
conduct a further study after Brexit or to extend this research into a longitudinal multi-
disciplinary study as the process of constitutional change unfolds. This would enable 
firms to reflect on events, threats, opportunities and their impact. It could also put greater 
emphasis on the seizing and transforming stages of the dynamic capabilities perspective 
and on the response and recovery stages of building resilience. Firms in the EU will also 
be affected by Brexit as it will impact the EU as a whole and the trade relations between 
the UK and the EU as well as between individual firms in the UK and EU. It could 
therefore also be valuable to look at how actors in mainland Europe that are remaining in 
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Table 1: Interview and Workshop Participants 
 
 
Case Study Company Details and Associated Interviewee Mnemonics 
 
Organisation Products/ Services 
Interviewee 
Mnemonics 
NGO 1 Farming Members Association NG1 
NGO 2 Farming Members Association  NG2 
NGO 3 Food Policy Think Tank NG3 
Farm 1 Dairy Farm 
F1-I1 
F1-I2 
Farm 2 Dairy and Genetics Farm F2 
Farm 3 Livestock farm (cattle, sheep & chickens); and egg packing 
F3-I1 
F3-I2 
Processor 1 Sandwiches, ready meals, vegetable boxes P1 
Processor 2 Sausage/ burger factory P2 
Processor 3 Bread producer P3 
Processor 4 Cake producer P4 
Retailer 1 Farm Shop R1 
Retailer 2 Innovative food boxes R2 




Retailer 4 National Supermarket R4 
Total participants: 18 
 
Workshop Participants and Associated Workshop Mnemonics 
 
Organisational types represented Workshop 1 (W1) Workshop 2 (W2) 
Farmer 4 1 
Processor 1 2 
Retailer 2 2 
NGO 3 4 








Table 2: Summary of Key Empirical evidence 
 
 
(a) Evidence of Threats/ Challenges Surrounding Brexit 
 
Threat/ Challenge Sample Quotes from the Evidence Sources 
Worse replacement of 
the CAP (Common 
Agricultural Policy) e.g. 
in terms of regulation 
and farm subsidy 
 “dŚĞŶŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƵďƐŝĚǇ ?ƚŚĞůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚŝƐƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǆƚ ?ƚŽ ?ǇĞĂƌƐŝƚ ?ůůĚǁŝŶĚůĞŽƌĞǀĞŶĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌ ?& ? 
 “ ?ĂůŽƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĨŽŽĚƐĂĨĞƚǇĂŶĚƋƵĂůŝƚǇĐŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĚŝĨŝƚŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh<ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĐƌĞĂƚĞŝƚƐŽǁŶƐƚĂŶdards 
that are in line currently with Europe. " R3-I2 
"we do need to head off a danger, which is that we go and ditch some of our environmental credentials under the pressure to go and 
do deals and get trade going and all the rest of it. So we need to head that off. "W1 
F1-I1, F1-I2, F2, 





for example, to a lack 
of investment 
confidence 
 “/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂŶĚůĂĐŬŽĨĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-ŵĂŬŝŶŐǁŽƵůĚďĞƌŝŐŚƚĂƚƚŚĞƚŽƉĨŽƌŵĞ ?/ƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƵŶŬŶŽǁŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝs no will to reinvest 
 ?ǁĞĐŽƵůĚďĞ ?ƚŽ ?ǇĞĂƌƐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵĂŶǇƌĞĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making, you know anything to hang your hat on.  So for me the instability and 
ƚŚĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇŝƐƚŽƉŽĨƚŚĞůŝƐƚĨŽƌŵĞ ? ?& ? 
 ?dŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨŚŽƌƚŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐ/ ?ŵƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ to are in a bit of a wait and see at this moment in time  ? ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ‘/Ĩŝƚ ?Ɛ
ŐŽŝŶŐƚŽĐŽƐƚŵĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽƉƵƚƚŚŝƐŵĂĐŚŝŶĞŝŶ ?ŝƚ ?ƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƌĞƉůĂĐĞ ? ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚǁĂŝƚĂŶĚƐĞĞďĞĨŽƌĞŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĂt investment 
ĂƐǁĞůů ? ? ? W2 
F1-I1, F2, P1, 
P2-I1, R2, R4, 
NGO1, NGO2, 
NGO3, W1, W2  
Poorer international 
trade agreements 
  “/ƚǁŝůůĚĞƉĞŶĚŽŶǁŚĂƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƐǁŚĞŶŽƵƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŐŽĞƐƚŽƚŚĞhŽŶŵĂƐƐĨŽƌƚƌĂĚĞĚĞĂůƐ ?ƚŚĞǇŵĂǇƐĂǇƚŚĂƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƚŚĞǇǁant 
ƚŽƌĞƚĂŝŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƌƚŽĨŽƵƌŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ĂŶĚǁĞ ?ƌĞnot going to put any tariffs on, but farming may be the industry that gets sacrificed, the 
ƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐŝĂůůĂŵď ?/ƚĚĞƉĞŶĚƐǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞŽŶ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬĨĂƌŵŝŶŐǁŝůůďĞŶĞƚůŽƐĞƌƐ ? ?F2 
F1-I1, F2, P1, 
P2-I1, R3-I2, R3-




horticulture and the 
abbattoirs  
 ?KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞďŝŐŐĞƐƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǀŽƚĞǁĂƐƐƚĂĨĨ ?/ŶŝƚŝĂůůǇƚŚĞWŽůŝƐŚůĂĚƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂŐƌĞĂƚĚĞĂůŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ? ?W4 
"The two [European] lads, one lad on the van is a fully qualified paramedic and the other lad has just finished a full career in the army, 
a paramedic, battlefield medic. Just amazingly talented individuals, amazing intelligent individuals  ? They bring that into whatever job 
ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĚŽŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĚŽƚŚĂƚũŽďƌĞĂůůǇ ?ƌĞĂůůǇǁĞůů ?dŚĂƚŝƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞƐƵĐŚĂŶĞŶŽƌŵŽƵƐůŽƐƐŝĨƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƚĂŬĞŶĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƵs. Enormous 
ůŽƐƐ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚ ?ƐŐƌĞĂƚůǇƵŶĚĞƌǀĂůƵĞĚ ? ? P3 
F1-I2, F3-I1, P3, 




Food price inflation, 
e.g. due to higher 
labour costs or lower 
farm subsidy 
 ?/ĨƚŚĞĨŽŽĚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŝŶƚŚĞh<ĨĞůůŽŶŝƚƐĨĂĐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚŝĨŝƚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĂƚĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĂƚůĂďŽƵƌŽƌŶŽŶ-EU labour, that would 
lead to obviously considerable food price inflation." W1 
 ?/ĨŽŶĞƚŚŝƌĚ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌƚŽƵƚĞĚĂďŽƵƚ ?ŽŶĞƚŚŝƌĚŽĨĨĂƌŵŝŶĐŽŵĞŝƐĨƌŽŵhƐƵďƐŝĚŝĞƐƚŚĞŶŝŶĞƐƐĞŶĐĞĨĂƌŵƉƌŝĐĞƐƐŚŽƵ ld be 50% 
higher if we are paying the true price and that would be reflected ultimately through price at the tills ...  “P1 
F1-I1, F2, P1, 
P2-I1, P3, P4, 
R3-I2, W1, W2 
Fewer family farms, 
due to efficiency drives 
  “ ?there is the trend towards  ? only big businesses currently surviving the kind of environment. So, you get a senƐĞƚŚĂƚ ? there will 
be a continual consolidation and possibly an acceleration because of the uncertainty and bureaucratic barriers to trade with Europe 
outside of the EU." NGO3 




 ?ŝƚ ?ƐĂůůǀĞƌǇǁĞůůĨŽƌƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŽƐŝƚƚŚĞƌĞĂŶĚƐĂǇ ? ‘KŬĂǇ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇĨĂƌŵ ? ?ďƵƚƵŶůĞƐƐƚŚĞǇŵĂŶĂŐĞƚŚĂƚ
ĂƐĂŶĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇŐƌĂĚƵĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǇŽƵ ?ůůŚĂǀĞĂůŽƚŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůĐƌŝƐŝƐŝŶƌƵƌĂůĂƌĞĂƐ ? " W2 
Lack of voice for the 
farming community 
"There is very few of us that actually get this money  ?W ?ĂŶĚǁĞĐĂŶ ?ƚƉƵůůƚŚĂƚŵĂŶǇǀŽƚĞƐ ? ? F1-I2 
  “dŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂƌĞŶŽƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞƐŝƚƚŝŶŐĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƚĂďůĞƚĂůŬŝŶŐƚŽŐƌŽƵƉƐŽĨĨĂƌŵĞƌƐĨŽƌĂŶǇůĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŝŵĞ ?dŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞ
ƚĂůŬŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞůŝŬĞƐŽĨtĂŝƚƌŽƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŽĨůĚŝĂŶĚĂ^ŝŶƐďƵƌǇ ?ƐĂŶĚƐo on, to ask what do we need to do to make sure that your shelves 
ĂƌĞĨƵůů ?dŚĞǇǁŝůůǁĂŶƚƚŽŬĞĞƉĂůŝĚŽŶĨŽŽĚƉƌŝĐĞŝŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞŶĚŽĨƐƚŽƌǇ ? ? F2 
F1-I1, F1-I2, F2, 
NGO3 
Currency effects, 
leading to more 
expensive imports 
 “/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞǁĞĂŬĞŶŝŶŐŽĨŽƵƌcurrency that we have seen since Brexit will have a benefit to our businesses in the short term but I think 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĚŝƵŵĂŶĚůŽŶŐƚĞƌŵĐŽƵůĚďĞǀĞƌǇĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ ?& ?-I2 
"Exchange rates, for instance. If anybody here ever buys oven ĐŚŝƉƐ ? ? ?ĂŶǇďŽĚǇ ?EŽ ?ǁĞ ?ƌĞĂůůĨĂƌƚŽŽŵŝĚĚůĞ-class to buy oven chips. 
Okay, one or two, thank you. You cannot find an own-ůĂďĞůŽǀĞŶĐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚĞh<ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŶŽƚŵĂĚĞŝŶĞůŐŝƵŵ ?^ŽǇŽƵƌŽǀĞŶĐŚŝƉƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
are about the lowest common denominator you can find in terms of food value are...  ?ŵŽƌĞĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞ ? ?The reason the chips are 
ŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌĞĚ ŝŶ ĞůŐŝƵŵ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ǁĞ ƉƌĞĨĞƌ ĞůŐŝĂŶ ƉŽƚĂƚŽĞƐ ƚŽ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ƉŽƚĂƚŽĞƐ ? ŝƚ ?Ɛ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ ?Ɛ ďĞĞŶ ŵĂƐƐŝǀĞ ĐĂƉŝtal 
investment in very efficiently converting potatoes inƚŽĐŚŝƉƐ ? ? ? ?KŶĐĞǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚƚŚĞŵŽŶĞǇŝŶƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ŝ ?ƐƌĞĂůůǇŚĂƌĚƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞ
ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŚŝŐŚďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐƚŽĞŶƚƌǇ ? ? ?^ŽƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ? ? W1 
F1-I2, P4, NGO2, 
W1 
 
(b) Evidence of Opportunities Surrounding Brexit 
 
Opportunity Sample Quotes from the Evidence Sources 




 “/Ŷ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŽŽĚ ĨƌŽŵ ĂďƌŽĂĚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞ ǁŝƚŚ ? ŝƚǁŝůů ďĞĐŽŵĞ ŵŽƌĞ ĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ŐŝǀĞƐ ƵƐ ŵŽƌĞ
opportunity ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌŽƵƌŝŶƉƵƚǁŝůůďĞŽŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƐĐĂůĞŵŽƌĞĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞ ? ?& ?-I2 
 ?/ƚŚŝŶŬǁĞ ?ůůďĞŽŬĂǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ƚŚŝŶŬǁĞ ?ƌĞĂƌŝƚŝƐŚĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĂŶĚǁĞ ?ƌĞƌĞĂůůǇďĂƐĞĚŽŶůŽĐĂůŝƐŵ ?Yes, I think for anybody with a more 
European supply chain I think it will be really difficult, I really do. ?W ?-I1 
F1-I2, P2-I1, P2-
I2, P4, R2, R3-I1, 




replacement e.g. with 
more effective 
subsidies. 
 ?^ŽŝƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞƚŚĂƚĂĨƵŶĚŝŶŐƐĐŚĞŵĞŐŽŝŶŐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚŝƐǁŚĞƌĞĂĨĂƌŵĞƌ ?ƐĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽůŽŽŬĂƚŚŝƐĐŽƐƚƐĂŶĚŐŽƐŽŵĞǁŚĞƌĞǁŚĞƌĞŚĞ ?Ɛ
helping himself with cost efficiency, that triggers funding for that farm.   ?ŝƚ ?ƐƚŚĞďĞƚƚĞƌĨĂƌŵĞƌƐƚŚĂƚŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞƌĞǁĂƌĚĞĚƐŽŝƚƉƵƐŚĞƐ
the other ones to get better and make a betteƌũŽďŽĨǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĚŽŝŶŐ ?" F3-I1 
"one thing that governments will look at, which is important as well, is the tourism and tourism and agriculture. So if those farmers are 
getting a bigger-ish payment linked to looking after that environment in a way that is encouraging for the tourism, thaƚ ?ƐĂůůǀĞƌǇ ?ǀĞƌǇ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŽƵƌŝƐƚƐĂƌĞĞĂƚŝŶŐĨŽŽĚƚŚĞƌĞĂŶĚĂůůƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨŝƚ ?^Žŝƚ ?ƐĂďŽƵƚďĂůĂŶĐĞ ? ? F3-I1 
F2, F3-I1, F3-I2, 
P1, R3-I1, 
NGO1, NGO2, 
NGO3, W1, W2 
More effective supply 
chain business models 
"There are plenty of farms that could adjust their lambing times, or those sheep that are seasonal lambers or performers, I guess, you 
ĐŽƵůĚĞǆƚĞŶĚŝƚ ?zŽƵĐŽƵůĚĞǆƚĞŶĚƚŚĞƐĞĂƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽĚŽƵďƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĂƚ ?ďƵƚǇŽƵĐŽƵůĚĂůƐŽŵĂŬĞŵŽƌĞŽĨŽůĚĞƌ-season lamb and 
ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ/ƚŚŝŶŬǁĞ ?ǀĞƌĞĂůůǇĨĂŝůĞĚŝŶ ? ? NGO2 
 “ǁĞ ?ƌĞŶŽƚĂĐŚĂƌŝƚǇ ?ďƵƚŝƚ ŝƐŵĂŬŝŶŐƵƐƚŚŝŶŬĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇĂďŽƵƚǁŚĞƌĞǁĞĐĂŶŽĨĨĞƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚǀĞƌƐƵƐǁŚĞƌĞǁĞĚŽĂůƐŽŶĞĞĚƚŽŵake 
ŵŽŶĞǇ ?ĂŶĚ/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞůĂŶĚƐĐĂƉĞŚĂƐĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ?/ŵĞĂŶ ?/ ?ǀĞƐĞĞŶǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞůĂst five months have a dramatic impact on 









 “What ŵŝŐŚƚŚĂƉƉĞŶŝƐǁĞůŽŽŬƚŽĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ/ ?ŵŶŽƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞŚŽǁƚŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚĂƉƉĞĂƌ ?ďƵƚǁĞŵŝŐŚƚ
ůŽŽŬƚŽĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚĚŽŶĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ  ? ?W ? 
"X mentioned the halal market. There are about 12 million Muslims in France and Germany and that is a massive export market for us. 
That market will not go away after Brexit, it will be there. The question is at what cost will we access the market? " W1 







"I think even if we built our domestic market up here in the UK, there are still a lot of products within our sheep that we dŽŶ ?ƚĐŽŶƐƵŵĞ
here, and yet they do in other populations across the world. The more we get eaten, the less we have to pay to get disposed, so the 
more we can sell. So the opening up of the Chinese market to sell the fifth quarter-ƚǇƉĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ?ďŝƚƐĂŶĚƉŝĞĐĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ
dream of eating here." NGO2 
"[politicians have] been talking about food becoming cheaper post-Brexit. That was something that was spoken about by the Brexit 
campaign. Largely that argument hinges on trade, doing free trade deals with non-hĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐƐĂǇ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐƐĂǇEĞǁ





(c) Evidence of Extant Resilience Attributes 
 
Resilience Attribute Sample Quotes from the Evidence Sources 
Assets e.g. land, 
buildings, production 
capacity etc 
"And land values have traditionally always ďĞĞŶƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶƚŝŶŵǇĐĂƌĞĞƌďƵƚ ?ůŝŬĞ/ƐĂŝĚĞĂƌůŝĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĞĂŶƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĞǇĂůǁĂǇƐǁŝůů
ďĞ ? ?dŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚĂĨĨĞĐƚƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨŽƵƌĂƐƐĞƚƐ ? ?& ?-I2 
 ?dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽƐŚŽƌƚĂŐĞŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞŝŶǀĞƐƚĞĚŽĨĨƚŚĞĨĂƌŵƐƚŽŽ ?ƐŽƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞďŽƵŐŚƚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞďĞĐŽŵĞůĂŶĚůŽƌĚƐ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ
ůĞƚƚŝŶŐƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ?zŽƵƐĞĞƚŚĂƚŝŶĐůƵƐƚĞƌƐ ?/ ?ŵŶŽƚƐƵƌĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌǇŽƵ ?ĚƐĞĞŝƚŚĞƌĞ ?ďƵƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇďĞƌǇƐƚǁǇƚŚǇou see it a lot. 
/ƚ ?ƐĂƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇƚŽǁŶĂŶĚĂůŽƚŽĨƚŚĞĨĂƌŵĞƌƐŚĂǀĞďŽƵŐŚƚƵƉŚŽƵƐĞƐŝŶďĞƌǇƐƚǁǇth and let them to students. " NGO2 
F1-I2, F3- I1, P2-
I1, P3, P4, NGO2 
Government support 
e.g.for farming, due to 
food security needs, 
environmental 
stewardship needs and 
links to tourism. 
"I think in the future the sort of things that we probably get paiĚĨŽƌĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĐůĂƐƐĞĚĂƐƐƵďƐŝĚǇ ?ǁĞ ?ůůďĞƉĂŝĚĨŽƌƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?
environmental announcements or public good, etc., " W1 
 “you get the sense that there could be opportunity for the whole agricultural sector and horticultural sector for  W  ? W discussions around 




e.g. to develop new 
ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐǁŝƚŚ ?ƋƵŝƌŬǇ ?
products 
"[R3] ŚŽƐƚƐƋƵĂƌƚĞƌůǇǁŚĂƚ ?ƐĐĂůůĞĚĂDĞĞƚƚŚĞƵǇĞƌĚĂǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĂƚŝƐƚŽĂůůŽǁƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐǁŚŽŚĂǀĞƐƵďmitted ideas in 
through a .. Meet The Buyer website portal, things that they believe we could do so much better than anybody else, and the kind of 
ƋƵŝƌŬǇŝĚĞĂƐƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŚĂǀĞŐŽƚǁĞ ?ůůƚƌƵůǇǀĂůƵĞ ?dŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?ǁĞŝŶǀŝƚĞƚŚĞďƵǇĞƌƐŝŶƚŽŵĞĞƚƚŚĞďƵǇer and 
ƐŚŽǁĐĂƐĞƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚ ?ƐŽŝƚ ?ƐĂƌĞĂůůǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐĚĂǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞ ?ůůƐĞĞĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚǁĞ ?ǀĞŶĞǀĞƌƐĞĞŶŽŶƚŚĞŵĂƌŬet before ?
R3-I2 
F1-I1, F1-I2, F2, 
F3-I1, R1, R3-I1, 
R3-I2, R3-I3, W1 
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 ?EŽƚŽŶůǇŚĂǀĞǁĞďĞĞŶĨŝƌƐƚƚŽŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ǁĞ ?ǀĞĂůƐŽďĞĞŶĂůŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞĂƚĞƐƚďĞĚŽƌĂůĂƵŶĐŚƉĂĚĨŽƌĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞƐƵďƐĞƋuently 
grown to be suppliers to the whole of the UK ?Z ?-I3 
Risk assessment and 
risk taking e.g. when 
entering new markets 
or assessing the 
potential impact of 
Brexit  
"now  ?& ? ?Ɛ ? challenge, and this is what will make or break him in terms of the beginning of his career, is to now turn round what 
happened in the last month and make a new market on the back of that, where we spread our risk across a number of different 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ŶĚ/ ?ůůďĞĨĂƐĐŝŶĂƚĞĚƚŽƐĞĞŚŽǁƚŚĂƚŐŽĞƐ ? ? F1-I2 
 ?/ƚ ?Ɛ [Brexit is] ĂǁĂƚĐŚŝŶŐďƌŝĞĨĂŶĚŝƚ ?ƐƚĂŬŝŶŐĂĚǀŝĐĞĨƌŽŵƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĂƌĞďĞƚƚĞƌƉůĂĐĞĚƚŚĂŶƵƐ ?^Žŝƚ ?ƐƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
community, banking, professional services organisations. It will be interesting to see, we have a global professional services company 
doing some work for us looking at risk. " P1 
F1-I2, F3-I2, P1, 
P3, R1, R4,  
NGO2 
Supply chain 
relationships e.g. to 
communicate 
effectively to 
consumers and to 
ensure appropriate 
pricing for milk and 
lamb 
"I think one of the pleasurable things about our buƐŝŶĞƐƐŝƐƌĞůĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŽŽƵƌĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐĂŶĚďĞŝŶŐĂďůĞƚŽƐĂǇ “ůŽŽŬŽƵƌƉƌŝĐĞƐĂƌĞ
like this because this is what we do. This is where our ingredients come from, and this is what we do, this is how we handle it and it is 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ? ?/ƚŝƐĂƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞƌĞůĂǇing that and telling the story. It helps businesses like ours survive really." P4 
"Very much what we try and do is deal directly with first-tier suppliers. Our objective is always to cut out the middleman because of the 
size of our business and go straight ƚŽƐŽƵƌĐĞ ?tĞĨĞĞůƚŚĂƚŝƚ ?ƐŵŽƌĞƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?ǁĞĨĞĞůƚŚĂƚŝƚ ?ƐĂďŽƵƚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
with the first tier, so that we can work in partnership with them  ?ǁĞǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚƚƌǇĂŶĚǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚůŽĐĂůƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂǁŝŶ-
win solution for both." ?Z ?-I2 
F1-I1, F2, P1, 
P2-I1, P4, R3-I1, 




Diversification e.g. into 
other businesses, 
additional supply chain 
tiers, or new crops 
following market 
demand 
"the development of [the farm shop and factory unit complex] ?ŐŽƚŵĞŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞĨĂƌŵǇĂƌĚǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŽũĞĐƚŽĨĚŝǀĞƌƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
take the business forward" F3-I1 
"We have a big range of Jewish foods in the counter, because the population in the  ? ĂƌĞĂĚŽĞƐŚĂǀĞŵŽƌĞ:ĞǁŝƐŚĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ?tĞ ?ǀĞ
ŶŽƚĚŽŶĞƚŚĂƚďĞĨŽƌĞŝŶŽƚŚĞƌƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?ďƵƚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂĚĞŶƐĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŽƌƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŶǁĞwill put 
ŵŽƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĂƚƚǇƉĞ ?Z ?-I2 
"So, we had Charollais sheep and Charolais cattle. Those breeds were imported from Europe because of the desire at that time for 
lean meat. Everybody was talking about lean diets, less fat and that" F3-I1 
 “/ƚŚŝŶŬĂƌĂďůĞǁŝůůƐƵƌǀŝǀĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞĞƋƵĂůůǇŝĨǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂƌĂďůĞůĂŶĚŝƚǁŝůůůĞŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽother sorts of things so you could do other sorts 
of things potentially, grow other crops you know just for the market. " NGO1 
F1-I1, F2, F3-I1, 
P2-I1, R3-I2, R1, 
R3-I3, NGO1, 
NGO2, NGO3, 
W1,W2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
